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Non-associative public-key cryptography
Arkadius Kalka
Abstract
We introduce a generalized Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key estab-
lishment protocol (KEP) for magmas. This leads to the foundation of
non-associative public-key cryptography (PKC), generalizing the concept
of non-commutative PKC. We show that left selfdistributive systems ap-
pear in a natural special case of a generalized AAG-KEP for magmas,
and we propose, among others instances, concrete realizations using f -
conjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups. We discuss
the advantages of our schemes compared with the classical AAG-KEP
based on conjugacy in braid groups.
1 Introduction
Currently public key cryptography still relies mainly on a few number-theoretic
problems, namely integer factorization [RSA78] and the computation of discrete
logarithms in Z×p and over elliptic curves. The systems based on these problems
remain unbroken. Nevertheless, after the advent of quantum computers, systems
like RSA [RSA78] and its variants (e.g. [Ra79]), Diffie-Hellman (DH) [DH76],
ElGamal [El85] and ECC [Mi85, Ko87] will be broken easily [Sh97, PZ03].
Under the label Post Quantum Cryptography, there have been several efforts to
develop new cryptographic primitives which may also serve for the post quan-
tum computer era. Here we focus on key establishment protocols (KEP’s) as
cryptographic primitives, because they are the most important and the hardest
to construct. Note that, using hash functions, it is easy to build public key
encryption schemes from KEP’s.
One approach became later known as non-commutative cryptography. Recall
that the involved algebraic structures in the number-theoretic systems are com-
mutative groups and rings. In non-commutative cryptography these are replaced
by non-commutative groups and rings, and we consider computational problems
therein. One may say that, roughly, the discrete logarithm problem is replaced
by the conjugacy problem and its variants. After some precursors, in partic-
ular [WM85], non-commutative cryptography was mainly established in a few
seminal papers around the turn of the millenium [AAG99, KL+00, CK+01]. Of
particular importance is the ingenious Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) Commu-
tator KEP which only exists in the non-commutative setting, while the systems
in [KL+00, CK+01] may be considered as staightforward non-commutative ana-
logues of the classical DH-KEP.
Since they admit efficiently computable normal forms and a supposedly hard
conjugacy problem, braid groups were explicitly suggested as platform groups
for these systems. Nevertheless, explicit specifications of these systems in braid
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groups as well as most other non-commutative cryptosystems have been bro-
ken over the last decade. This led to some understandable decline of interest
in non-commutative cryptography inside the main cryptographic community. A
revival of non-commutative cryptography may be achieved by means of research
in one of the following two directions.
The first approach is to stick with the suggested protocols and search for better
platform groups. One may even keep braid groups as platforms and search for
families of hard instances of the conjugacy problem that can be efficiently gen-
erated. Note that the main reason why braid-based cryptosystems have been
broken is the fact that "randomly" generated keys turned out to be a very bad
choice. This situation is quite typical for public-key cryptography. Consider,
for example, the familiar RSA scheme where the keys have to be chosen with
care.
Another approach is to construct new or generalized non-commutative cryp-
tosystems which are based on other or supposedly harder computational prob-
lems. In this and some subsequent papers we pursue the latter approach. In par-
ticular, we broaden the scope of non-commutative cryptography as we go beyond
non-commutative, associative binary oparations - we utilize non-associative bi-
nary operations, i.e. magmas. Thus, we hope to establish the field of non-
associative public-key cryptography. In particular, we generalize the AAG-KEP
for monoids to a general AAG-KEP for magmas.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we emphasize
the important and integrating role of the AAG protocol in non-commutative
and commutative cryptography. In particular, we introduce a generalized no-
tion of AAG-KEP for monoids (section 2.1), and we show that not only the
AAG commutator KEP for groups [AAG99] (section 2.2), but also the Ko-Lee
et al. protocol, the group Diffie-Hellman protocol (section 2.3), and even the
classical DH-KEP (section 2.5) are special instances of that generalized AAG
scheme. Furthermore, we also subsume the Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Rauly-
naitis KEP(STR-KEP), a natural hybrid of the classical DH-KEP and the Ko-
Lee-KEP, as a further instance (section 2.6).
The main innovative part of this paper is contained in the sections 3 and 4. In
particular, in section 3.1 we extend the generalized AAG-KEP from monoids to
magmas. Here finitely generated submonoids are replaced by f.g. submagmas,
and Alice and Bob know their secret key submagma elements as products of the
generators, including planar rooted binary trees describing the bracket structure
of such products. First examples of instances of the generalized AAG-KEP for
magmas are a non-associative KEP based on simultaneous double coset problem
and symmetric decomposition problem (see sections 3.2 and 3.3).
The most interesting and natural instances of the generalized AAG-KEP for
magmas come from left-selfdistributive (LD) systems and their generalizations
(section 4). In section 4.1 we introduce LD- and multi-LD-systems with f -
conjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups as key examples for
LD-operations. The nonassociative AAG f -commutator KEP (section 4.2) and
the AAG shifted commutator KEP (section 4.3) are discussed as major exam-
ples. We note that for these instances we may even drop the simultaneity of
the underlying base problems (f - and shifted conjugacy problems), because here
submagmas generated by one element still have a rich and complicated structure
and a hard membership problem. This implies that these systems are the first
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KEP’s based on the shifted and f -conjugacy problem.
In section 5 we discuss generalizations, like AAG-schemes over non-associative
magmas, open problems and further work.
Summary. The main purpose of this paper is popularize the notion of non-
associative cryptography and to provide a general framework for non-associative
and non-commutative KEP’s by utilizing the unifying approach that stems
from the general AAG-KEP for magmas. We argue for the superiority of
the non-associative schemes introduced in section 4 compared to classical non-
commutative AAG commutator KEP.
Anyway, in our opinion the field of non-commutative cryptography lacked over
the last years supply of new innovative cryptosystems. We hope that non-
associative cryptography will contribute to revived interest in non-commutative
cryptography.
Outlook. Nevertheless, this is not the end, rather the beginning of the story
of non-associative cryptography.
In the forthcoming paper [KaT12], by introducing a small asymmetry in the non-
associative AAG protocol for magmas, we succeed to construct non-associative
KEP’s for all LD- and multi-LD-systems (in general: sets with distributive op-
erations). We consider the systems and instances given in [KaT12] as much
more practical and interesting than the one given in this paper. In particular,
since these systems work for all LD- and multi-LD-systems, they deploy two
further advantages. First, we may consider encryption functions using iterated
multiplication (in the magma) from the left. Therefore, in order to obtain the
secret key an attacker has to solve an iterated f - or shifted conjugacy problem.
Second, for a given (partial) multi-LD-system it turns out that even the used
operations can be hidden, i.e., they are part of the secret key.
Historical remarks. Non-associative structures, in particular quasigroups
seem to have a long history in cryptography. For an overview on cryptographic
applications of quasigroups and Latin squares, see [Shc09, GS10, Shc12]. In
particular, we mention the work of Denes and Keedwell [DK74, DK91, DK92,
DK02]. Nevertheless, except for authentication schemes and zero-knowledge
protocols, most of these applications are in classical (i.e. symmetric key) cryp-
tography. The earliest quasigroup-based public-key cryptosystem that we are
aware of is due to Koscielny and Mullen [KM99].
Non-associative cryptography that goes beyond quasigroups, in particular, the
generalized AAG-KEP for magmas were introduced by the author in his PhD
thesis in 2007 [Ka07]. During a postdoctoral stay at the Bar-Ilan University,
hosted by M. Teicher, we had the opportunity to refine and improve our non-
associative systems. In particular, we developed the non-associative KEP’s for
all distributive systems [KaT12]. Over the last years we also had the opportunity
to promote non-associative cryptography at several conferences, in particular in
Dortmund 2007, Hoboken 2009, Montreal 2010, Caen 2011.
Other non-associative cryptosystems that came up during the last few years
include [GMK08, MZ12].
Acknowledgements. This work is an extension of a part of my PhD thesis.
Therefore, I wish to thank my supervisor L. Gerritzen for his kind support, en-
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couragement, constant interest and steadfast patience. In particular, his great
interest in non-associatve algebraic structures as well as public key cryptography
formed the scientific environment that made me bring these subjects together.
I am greatly indebted to P. Dehornoy who introduced an authentication scheme
based on his notion of shifted conjugacy [De06]. This in the first place inspired
me to come up with a KEP based on shifted conjugacy and in the course of this
work to invent non-associative cryptography.
I thank M. Teicher who was my host during my postdoctoral studies at Bar-Ilan
University, Israel, in 2007-2011. For that time period I acknowledge financial
support by The Oswald Veblen Fund and by the Minerva Foundation of Ger-
many.
This paper was written up during my stay at the MPIM Bonn, Jan-March 2012,
and finished during my postdoctoral stay at UQ, Brisbane. For the latter I ac-
knowledge support by the Australian Research Council (project DP110101104).
For valuable and stimulating discussions I thank L. Gerritzen, R. Holtkamp
and R. Avanzi at Ruhr-University Bochum, M. Kreuzer and G. Rosenberger in
Dortmund, B. Tsaban, D. Goldfeld, B. Kunyavskij and R. Cohen at BIU, A.
Myasnikov, A. Ushakov and G. Zapata at CRM, D. Grigoriev and D. Tieudjo
at MPIM, and B. Burton, M. Elder and S. Tillmann in Australia. For fur-
ther discussions during conferences I thank J. Gonzalez-Meneses, P. Bellingeri,
V. Gebhardt, E. and S.J. Lee. Particularly, I thank B. Tsaban for continuing
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2 Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key establishment
2.1 AAG key establishment protocol for monoids
Here we use and describe a slightly generalized version of the AAG key estab-
lishment protocol for monoids [AAG99]. Though it is easy to introduce further
generalisations, the following notion will suffice for our purposes.
For this general AAG key establishment protocol for monoids we need sets S1, S2,
two feasible monoids (M, ·M ), (N, ·N ), and functions
βi : Si ×M −→ N, γi : Si ×N −→ N, pii : Si −→M (i = 1, 2)
which satisfy the following conditions:
(1) For i = 1, 2, βi(x, ·) : M → N is for all x ∈ Si a monoid homomorphism,
i.e.
∀x ∈ Si, y1, y2 ∈M : βi(x, y1 ·M y2) = βi(x, y1) ·N βi(x, y2).
(2) For i = 1, 2, it is, in general, not feasible to determine a secret x ∈ Si from
the knowledge of y1, y2, . . . , yk ∈M and βi(x, y1), . . . , βi(x, yk) ∈ N .
(3) For all x ∈ S1 and y ∈ S2: γ1(x, β2(y, pi1(x))) = γ2(y, β1(x, pi2(y))).
Furthermore Alice and Bob select elements s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tn ∈M . These
elements are public, and they define submonoids SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 and SB =
〈t1, . . . , tn〉 of M . Now Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol
steps:
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1. Alice generates an element a ∈ S1 such that pi1(a) ∈ SA, and Bob chooses
a b ∈ S2 s.t. pi2(b) ∈ SB.
2. Alice computes the elements β1(a, t1), . . . , β1(a, tn) and publicly announces
this list. This list is her public key. Analogously Bob computes the ele-
ments β2(b, s1), . . . , β2(b, sm) and publishes this list.
3. Knowing that pi1(a) = r1 · · · rk with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} for some k ∈ N
and i = 1, . . . , k, Alice computes from Bob’s public key β2(b, pi1(a)) =
β2(b, r1 · · · rk)
(1)
= β2(b, r1) · · ·β2(b, rk).
And Bob, knowing pi2(b) = u1 · · ·uk′ with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn} for some
k′ ∈ N and j = 1, . . . , k′, computes from Alice’s public key β1(a, pi2(b)) =
β1(a, u1 · · ·uk′)
(1)
= β1(a, r1) · · ·β1(a, uk′).
4. Alice computes KA = γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))), and symmetrically Bob com-
putes KB = γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b))).
Because of (3), the equivalence KA = KB holds in the monoid N . Now
any key extractor φ defined on the monoid N provides a shared key φ(KA).
Here a key extractor is any effectively computable function from a monoid to
any keyspace1 (compare with [AAG03]). A key extractor may be given by a
normal form algorithm in the monoid, but in general the key extractor map
needs not be injective. Anyway, for brevity we will refer in the sequel to the
monoid element K := KA ∈ N as the shared key.
Alice’s secret key is the pair (a, I) ∈ S1×{1, . . . ,m}
k where I denotes the index
vector (I1, . . . , Ik) such that ri = sIi for i = 1, . . . , k, i.e., I determines a word
over {s1, . . . , sm} representing pi1(a) ∈ SA. Analogously Bob’s secret key is a
pair (b, J) ∈ S2 × {1, . . . , n}
k′
The AAG key agreement scheme is formulated in a too general manner to be
applied. For practical purposes we have to specify the sets S1, S2, the monoids
M,N and the functions βi, γi, pii for i = 1, 2.
Setting S1 = S2 = M , β1 = β2 and pi1 = pi2 = idM , we recover the original
AAG key establishment protocol for monoids [AAG99] as a special case of this
generalized notion.
2.2 AAG commutator KEP for groups
The AAG commutator KEP for groups [AAG99] is determined by the following
specifications: Let S1 = S2 = M = N = G be a group, and SA and SB are
assumed to be subgroups of G2. We have pi1 = pi2 = idG and β1 = β2 =: β.
The functions β, γ1, γ2 : G
2 → G are defined by
β(x, y) = x−1yx, γ1(x, y) = x
−1y, γ2(x, y) = y
−1x.
Note that the shared key is the commutator
KA = γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))) = γ1(a, b
−1ab) = a−1(b−1ab) = [a, b]
= (a−1ba)−1b = γ2(b, a
−1ba) = γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b))) = KB.
1A standard key space is the semigroup of bitstrings {0, 1}∗.
2 Now ri and uj are elements from {s
±1
1
, . . . , s
±1
m } and {t
±1
1
, . . . , t
±1
n }, respectively.
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If the group elements are given by representative words (over some alphabet of
generators) as usual in combinatorial group theory, then multiplication is defined
by simple concatenation of words. Therefore Alice and Bob have to publish the
words representing the elements β(a, ti) = a
−1tia and β(b, sj) = b
−1sjb in a
disguised form. Therefore the question, whether one can efficiently disguise
elements by using defining relations [SZ06], is very important for any platform
group. One way is to use efficiently computable normal forms.
Such efficiently computable normal forms exist in many groups, e.g., in braid
groups. Furthermore, the conjugator search, i.e. determining x from β(x, y) =
x−1yx, was assumed to be hard in braid groups. Therefore Anshel, Anshel and
Goldfeld suggested braid groups as platform groups for the AAG commutator
KEP [AAG99].
2.3 Group Diffie-Hellman key establishment
In 2000 Ko, Lee, Cheo, Han, Kang and Park introduced a new key agreement
scheme based on braid groups [KL+00]. Here we describe a generalized version
of this KEP [CK+01] for a general platform group G. Since this KEP is a
non-abelian generalization of the classical Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
in the abelian group F×p [DH76], we call it the group Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
establishment protocol. Let (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) be two pairs of public, com-
muting subgroups of a given group G, i.e., we have [Ai, Bi] = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Furthermore, let x be a “generic” element in G. Alice and Bob have to perform
the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2. And Bob selects his
private key (b1, b2) ∈ B1 ×B2.
2. Alice computes yA = a1xa2 and sends it to Bob. And Bob computes
yB = b1xb2 and submits it to Alice.
3. Alice receives yB and computes KA := a1yBa2. And Bob receives yA and
computes the shared key
KB := b1yAb2 = b1(a1xa2)b2 = a1(b1xb2)a2 = a1yBa2 = K.
For a1 = a
−1
2 and b1 = b
−1
2 we obtain the original Ko-Lee et al. protocol
[KL+00]. In [AAG03] it is shown that the Ko-Lee et al. protocol may be seen
also as an instance of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids. The follow-
ing proposition is a straightforward generalization of that claim from [AAG03]
using the same proof idea3.
Proposition 2.1. The group Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol is an
instance of the general Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids.
Proof. Here we set S1 = A1 × A2, S2 = B1 × B2, M = G and N = {g1xg2 |
(g1, g2) ∈ G
2}. On N we define the following “forgetful” binary opperation:
1 ·N u = u ·N 1 = u (∀x ∈ N) and u ·N v = u (∀u, v ∈ N, u 6= 1, v 6= 1).
3It is also a corrected reformulation of Proposition 5.1 in [Ka07].
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This turns N into a monoid. We define the functions β1 : (A1 ×A2)×G→ N
and β2 : (B1 ×B2)×G→ N by
β1((u1, u2), v) = β2((u1, u2), v) = u1xu2.
Then condition (1) is satisfied obviously. Indeed, given the forgetful operation
on N , any constant function β(u) : G → N provides a monoid homomor-
phism. Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard for the
group G to determine a = (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 from β((a1, a2), b) = a1xa2.
The computational problem is a search version of the Double Coset Problem or
Decomposition Problem (DCP) - see also section 2.4. We define the functions
γ1 : (A1 ×A2)×N → N and γ2 : (B1 ×B2)×N → N by
γ1((u1, u2), v) = γ2((u1, u2), v) = u1vu2.
Then (3) is satisfied, because we have for all a = (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2, b =
(b1, b2) ∈ B1 ×B2 (recall [Ai, Bi] = 1 for i = 1, 2):
γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))) = γ1((a1, a2), b1xb2) = a1(b1xb2)a2 =
b1(a1xa2)b2 = γ2((b1, b2), a1xa2) = γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b))).
This proves that the conditions (1)-(3) are fulfilled. It remains to show that
the protocol steps 1.-3. of the DH-KEP are specializations of the protocol steps
1.-4. of the general AAG-KEP. Set SA = SB = 〈x〉 and define, for i = 1, 2,
pii : Si −→M by u 7→ x, i.e., pi1, pi2 are constant functions.
1. Alice generates an element a = (a1, a2) ∈ S1 = A1×A2 such that pi1(a) =
x ∈ 〈x〉 = SA, and Bob chooses a b = (b1, b2) ∈ S2 = B1 × B2 s.t.
pi2(b) = x ∈ 〈x〉 = SB.
2. Alice computes the element β1(a, x) = a1xa2 = yA and publicly announces
this element. This element is her public key. Analogously Bob computes
the element β2(b, x) = b1xb2 = yB and publishes this element.
3. Knowing that pi1(a) = x, Alice computes from Bob’s public key β2(b, pi1(a)) =
β2(b, x) = b1xb2. Indeed, this computation is trivial, because here β2(b, pi1(a))
is Bob’s public key.
And Bob, knowing pi2(b) = x, computes from Alice’s public key β1(a, pi2(b)) =
β1(a, x) = a1xa2. Also this computation is trivial. Therefore, here proto-
col step 3 becomes redundant.
4. Alice computes KA = γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))) = a1yBa2, and symmetrically
Bob computes KB = γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b))) = b1yAb2. 
We have proven that the group DH-KEP is a special case of the AAG-KEP
for monoids. Nevertheless, not every special case is obvious. Indeed, the group
DH-KEP does not use the homomorphy property (1) at all. Therefore step 3
in this specification of the general AAG-KEP (see proof above) became triv-
ial. This observation motivates us to introduce the following somehow informal
notion:
Definition 2.2 We call a key establishment protocol AAG-like if it is an in-
stance of the general AAG-KEP and it utilizes property (1) in a non-trivial
way.
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According to this notion, and contrary to the AAG commutator KEP, the group
Diffie-Hellman KEP is not an AAG-like KEP, though it can be formally consid-
ered as an instance of the general AAG-KEP (see Proposition 2.1).
2.4 Base Problems
The following search problems are related with the group based protocols from
the previous sections. Let G be a group.
CSP (Conjugacy Search Problem):
Input: (s, sx) ∈ G2. (sx denotes x−1sx.)
Objective: Find x′ ∈ G such that sx
′
= sx.
l-simCSP (l-Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem):
Input: {(si, s
x
i ) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . , l}.
Objective: Find x′ ∈ G such that sx
′
i = s
x
i ∀i = 1, . . . , l.
subCSP (Subgroup Conjugacy Search Problem): Let H be a subgroup of G.
Input: (s, sx) ∈ G2 with x ∈ H ≤ G.
Objective: Find x′ ∈ H such that sx
′
= sx.
l-ssCSP (l-Simultaneous Subgroup Conjugacy Search Problem):
Input: {(si, s
x
i ) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . ,m} with x ∈ H ⊂ G.
Objective: Find x′ ∈ H such that sx
′
i = s
x
i ∀i = 1, . . . , l.
AAGP (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld Problem): LetA = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 andB = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉
be two f.g. subgroups of G.
Input: {(ai, a
y
i ) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {(bj, b
x
j ) ∈ G
2|j = 1, . . . ,m} with x ∈ A
and y ∈ B.
Objective: Find K := x−1y−1xy.
KLP (Ko-Lee Problem - a Diffie-Hellman version of the GCSP or CDP): LetA,B ≤
G with [A,B] = 1.
Input: (s, sx, sy) ∈ G3 with x ∈ A, y ∈ B.
Objective: Find K := x−1y−1sxy.
DCP (Double Coset or Decompositon Problem): Let H1, H2 ≤ G.
Input: (s, x1sx2) ∈ G
2 for some x1 ∈ H1 and x2 ∈ H2.
Objective: Find (x′1, x
′
2) ∈ H1 ×H2 such that x
′
1sx
′
2 = x1sx2.
CDP (Conjugacy Decompositon Problem):
Input: (s, sx) ∈ G2 with x ∈ H ≤ G.
Objective: Find (x′1, x
′
2) ∈ H
2 such that x′1sx
′
2 = s
x.
DH-DCP (Diffie-Hellman Decompositon Problem): A1, A2, B1, B2 subgroups of
G such that [Ai, Bi] = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Input: (s, x1sx2, y1sy2) ∈ G
3 with x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2, y1 ∈ B1, y2 ∈ B2.
Objective: Find K := x1y1sx2y2.
Indeed, the AAG commutator KEP, the Ko-Lee protocol and the group DH-
KEP are based on the AAGP, KLP and DH-DCP, respectively.
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Now, let P1, P2 be two computational problems. We say P1 is harder than P2 or
P1 implies P2, written P1 → P2, if a P1-oracle provides a solution to problem P2.
Proposition 2.3. We have the following hierarchy of search problems:
l-ssCSP
AAGP l-simCSP subCSP DCP
CSP CDP DH-DCP
KLP
 
 
 
 ✠ ❄
❅
❅
❅
❅❘
❅
❅
❅
❅❘ ❄
❅
❅
❅
❅❘
 
 
 
 ✠ ❄
❄
 
 
 
 ✠
Proof. Most of the sketched implications are obvious consequences of the
definitions. We just prove CDP → KLP and l-ssCSP → AAGP:
1. (see [KL+00]) The input is a triple (s, sx, sy) ∈ G3 with x ∈ A, y ∈ B,
and A,B ⊂ G with [A,B] = 1. A CDP-oracle provides (x1, x2) ∈ A
2 with
x1sx2 = s
x. Now we can compute the shared key
x1s
yx2 = x1y
−1syx2 = y
−1(x1sx2)y = y
−1(x−1sx)y = K.
2. Here the input is {(ai, a
y
i ) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . , k}∪{(bj , b
x
j ) ∈ G
2|j = 1, . . . ,m}
with x ∈ A = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 and y ∈ B = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉. A m-SGCSP-oracle
provides a x′ ∈ A with x′−1bjx
′ = bxj for all j = 1, . . . ,m. And a k-
SGCSP-oracle provides a y′ ∈ B with y′−1aiy
′ = ayi for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Now, since x′−1bjx
′ = bxj ⇔ [x
′x−1, bj ] = 1 ∀j, we have x
′ = cbx for
some cb ∈ CG(B). Here CG(B) denotes the intersection of all centralizers
CG(bj) of bj (j = 1, . . . ,m) in G. Analogously, we can write y
′ = cay with
ca ∈ CG(A) =
⋂k
i=1 CG(ai).
Now, x′ ∈ A implies cb ∈ A. Therefore we have [ca, cb] = 1, and we can
compute the shared key
K ′ := x′−1y′−1x′y′ = (cbx)
−1(cay)
−1cbxcay = x
−1c−1b y
−1c−1a cbxcay
= x−1y−1c−1b c
−1
a cbcaxy
!
= x−1y−1xy = K. 
We see, that solving the classical CSP is insufficient for breaking the AAG
protocol or the Ko-Lee protocol. Furthermore, it is, in general, insufficient to
solve the l-SCSP to obtain the shared key K of the AAG protocol [SU06]:
Let x′ = cbx ∈ G and y
′ = cay ∈ G with ca ∈ CG(A), cb ∈ CG(B) be the output
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of a m-SCSP-oracle and a k-SCSP-oracle, respectively. Then we have K ′ = K if
and only if [ca, cb] = 1. A necessary condition for [cb, ca] 6= 1 is cb /∈ A∧ ca /∈ B,
which implies x′ /∈ A∧ y′ /∈ B. Otherwise, if x′ /∈ A, but y′ ∈ B (or vice versa),
the adversary gets K ′ = K.
Alternatively, the adversary could solve the SCSP and the
MSP (Membership Search Problem):
Input: x, a1, . . . , ak ∈ G.
Objective: Find an expression of x as a word in a1, . . . , ak (notation x =
x(a1, . . . , ak)), if it exists, i.e. if x ∈ 〈a1, . . . , ak〉.
to break the AAG key agreement scheme [SU06]:
If a m-SCSP-oracle outputs a x′ = cbx ∈ A, then the MSP-oracle provides the
word expression x′(a1, . . . , ak). Now the adversary can compute the shared key
x′−1x′(ay1 , . . . , a
y
k) = x
′−1x′y = (x−1cb)y
−1(cbx)y = [x, y] = K.
But we have shown above, that it is not necessary to solve the MSP.
2.5 Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol
Recall the classical Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol [DH76]. Let G
be a cyclic group and x an element of big order in G. Alice and Bob have to
perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice chooses a k ∈ Z, computes yA = x
k, and sends it to Bob. And Bob
chooses a l ∈ Z, computes yB = x
l, and submits it to Alice.
2. Alice receives yB and computes KA := y
k
B. And Bob receives yA and com-
putes the shared key KB := y
l
A = (x
k)l = (xl)k = ykB = KA.
Proposition 2.4. The Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol is an instance
of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids. Furthermore it is a AAG-like
KEP.
Proof. Here we set S1 = S2 = Z and M = N = SA = SB = 〈x〉. For i = 1, 2,
we define the functions βi, γi : Z× 〈x〉 → 〈x〉 and pii : Z → 〈x〉 by
βi(k, y) = y
k, γi(k, y) = y and pii(k) = x
k.
Then, for i = 1, 2, condition (1) holds for all y1, y2 ∈ M , because M = 〈x〉 is
cyclic, and therefore abelian:
βi(k, y1 · y2) = (y1y2)
k = yk1y
k
2 = βi(k, y1) · βi(k, y2).
Note that exponentiation is only a homomorphism if the monoid M is abelian.
Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard to determine
k ∈ Z from β(k, x) = xk. The computational problem is well known as the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
And (3) is satisfied, because we have for all k, l ∈ Z:
γ1(k, β2(l, pi1(k))) = β2(l, x
k) = (xk)l = (xl)k = β1(k, x
l) = γ2(l, β1(k, pi2(l))).
This proves that the conditions (1)-(3) are fulfilled. It remains to show that
the protocol steps 1.-2. of the Diffie-Hellman KEP are specializations of the
protocol steps 1.-4. of the general AAG-KEP.
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1. Alice generates an element k ∈ S1 = Z such that pi1(k) = x
k ∈ 〈x〉 = SA,
and Bob chooses a l ∈ S2 = Z s.t. pi2(l) = x
l ∈ 〈x〉 = SB.
2. Alice computes the element β1(k, x) = x
k = yA and publicly announces
this element. This element is her public key. Analogously Bob computes
the element β2(l, x) = x
l = yB and publishes this element.
3. Knowing that pi1(k) = x
k, Alice computes from Bob’s public key β2(l, pi1(k)) =
β2(l, x
k) = (xk)l = (xl)k = ykB. And Bob, knowing pi2(l) = x, computes
from Alice’s public key β1(k, pi2(l)) = β1(k, x
l) = (xl)k = (xk)l = ylA.
4. Alice computes KA = γ1(k, β2(l, pi1(k))) = β2(l, pi1(k)) = y
k
B, and sym-
metrically Bob computes KB = γ2(l, β1(k, pi2(l))) = β1(k, pi2(l)) = y
l
A.
Since this is exactly the output of the computation in step 3, here step 4
is redundant or trivial.
Let us recall and emphasize that in step 3 the homomorphy property (1) is used
in a nontrivial way. For example, Alice knowing pi1(k) = x
k = x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
=: wk(x)
can compute
ykB = (β2(l, x))
k = (xl)k = wk(x
l) = xl · · ·xl︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(1)
= (x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)l
= (wk(x))
l = (xk)l = β2(l, wk(x)) = β2(l, pi1(k)).
Therefore, we may view the classical DH-KEP as an AAG-like KEP. 
2.6 Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis Key Estab-
lishment Protocol (STR-KEP)
The following KEP is a natural hybrid of the classical DH-KEP and the Ko-
Lee-KEP. It was introduced in 2007 by Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis
in [STR07]
Let G be a (noncommutative) group and A,B a pair of commuting subgroups
in G. Furthermore, let x be a “generic” element in G. Alice and Bob have to
perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key (k, a) ∈ Z×A. And Bob selects his private
key (l, b) ∈ Z×B.
2. Alice computes yA = a
−1xka and sends it to Bob. And Bob computes
yB = b
−1xlb and submits it to Alice.
3. Alice receives yB and computes KA := a
−1ykBa. And Bob receives yA and
computes the shared key
KB := b
−1ylAb = b
−1(a−1xka)lb = b−1(a−1(xk)la)b
= a−1(b−1(xl)kb)a = a−1(b−1xlb)ka = a−1ykBa = KA.
Proposition 2.5. The Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis Key Establish-
ment Protocol is an instance of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids.
Furthermore, it is an AAG-like KEP.
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Proof. Here we set S1 = Z×A, S2 = Z×B, M = SA = SB = 〈x〉 and N = G.
For i = 1, 2, we define the functions βi : Si × 〈x〉 → G and pii : Si → 〈x〉 by
βi((k, z), y) = z
−1ykz, γi((k, z), y) = z
−1yz and pii(k) = x
k.
Then, for i = 1, 2, condition (1) holds for all y, y′ ∈M :
βi((k, z), y · y
′) = z−1(yy′)kz = z−1ykz · z−1y′kz = βi((k, z), y) · βi((k, z), y
′).
Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard to determine
k ∈ Z and z ∈ G from β((k, z), x) = z−1xkz. The computational problem is a
“mixed problem” requiring to solve simultaneously the DLP and the CSP (see
[STR07]).
And (3) is satisfied, because we have for all k, l ∈ Z, a ∈ A, b ∈ B:
γ1((k, a), β2((l, b), pi1(k, a))) = a
−1β2((l, b), x
k)a = a−1(b−1(xk)lb)a
= b−1a−1(xl)kab = b−1β1((k, a), x
l)b = γ2((l, b), β1((k, a), pi2(l, b))).
This proves that the conditions (1)-(3) are fulfilled. It remains to show that
the protocol steps 1.-2. of the Diffie-Hellman KEP are specializations of the
protocol steps 1.-4. of the general AAG-KEP.
1. Alice generates an element (k, a) ∈ Z×A such that pi1(k, a) = x
k ∈ 〈x〉 =
SA, and Bob chooses (l, b) ∈ Z×B s.t. pi2(l, b) = x
l ∈ 〈x〉 = SB.
2. Alice computes the element β1((k, a), x) = a
−1xka = yA and publicly
announces this element. This element is her public key. Analogously
Bob computes the element β2((l, b), x) = b
−1xlb = yB and publishes this
element.
3. Knowing that pi1(k, a) = x
k, Alice computes from Bob’s public key β2((l, b), pi1(k, a)) =
β2((l, b), x
k) = b−1(xk)lb = (b−1xlb)k = ykB. And Bob, knowing pi2(l, b) =
x, computes from Alice’s public key β1((k, a), pi2(l, b)) = β1((k, a), x
l) =
a−1(xl)ka = (a−1xka)l = ylA.
4. Alice computesKA = γ1((k, a), β2((l, b), pi1(k, a))) = a
−1β2((l, b), pi1(k, a))a =
a−1ykBa, and symmetrically Bob computesKB = γ2((l, b), β1((k, a), pi2(l, b))) =
b−1β1((k, a), pi2(l, b))b = a
−1ylAb.
Let us recall and emphasize that also here in step 3 the homomorphy property
(1) is used in a nontrivial way. For example, Alice knowing pi1(k, a) = x
k =
x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
=: wk(x) can compute
ykB = (β2((l, b), x))
k = (b−1xlb)k = wk(b
−1xlb) = b−1xlb · · · b−1xlb︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(1)
= b−1(x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)lb = b−1(wk(x))
lb = b−1(xk)lb = β2((l, b), pi1(k, a)).
Therefore, we may view the STR-KEP as an AAG-like KEP. 
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3 Key establishment using non-associative oper-
ations
3.1 AAG scheme for magmas
Monoids are proposed as algebraic platform structures for the AAG key agree-
ment protocol in [AAG99]. But the monoid structure is only used in the AAG
scheme in order to guarantee that the secret key, e.g. Alice’s key a, is an uniquely
defined product of some given generators {s1, . . . , sm}, i.e. a = r1 ·r2 · · · rk with
ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} for all i. It is, of course, no problem to introduce brackets in
this expression in order to handle nonassoziative operations. Therefore, there
exists a straightforward generalization of the AAG scheme from monoids to
magmas.
A magma (sometimes also called grupoid) (M, ∗) is a set M equipped with a
binary operation ∗ on M , i.e. a function M ×M → M . Note that there are
no relations, which have to be satisfied by the elements of M . The notion of a
magma was introduced by N. Bourbaki (see, e.g., [Bo74]).
We describe the AAG key establishment protocol in the - for our purposes -
most general manner.
For i = 1, 2, let Si be a sets and (M, •i) and (N, ◦i) be magmas, i.e. there are
two operations on the sets M,N , respectively. For i = 1, 2, we need functions
βi : Si ×M → N, γi : Si ×N → N, pii : Si →M
which satisfy the following three conditions: io
(1) β1(x, ·) : (M, •2)→ (N, ◦2) is for all x ∈ S1 a magma homomorphism
4, i.e.
∀x ∈ S1, y, y
′ ∈M : β1(x, y •2 y
′) = β1(x, y) ◦2 β1(x, y
′).
Also β2(x, ·) : (M, •1)→ (N, ◦1) is for all x ∈ S2 a magma morphism, i.e.
∀x ∈ S2, y, y
′ ∈M : β2(x, y •1 y
′) = β2(x, y) ◦1 β2(x, y
′).
(2) It is, in general, not feasible to determine a secret x ∈ Si (i = 1, 2) from the
knowledge of
y1, y2, . . . , yk ∈M and βi(x, y1), βi(x, y2), . . . , βi(x, yk).
(3) For all a ∈ S1, b ∈ S2 : γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))) = γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b))).
Consider an element y of a magma (M, •) which is an iterated product
of other elements in M . Such an element can be described by a planar rooted
binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements y1, . . . , yk ∈M .
We use the notation y = T•(y1, . . . , yk). Here the subscript • tells us that the
grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation •.
Now, it is easy to prove by induction that any magma homomorphism β :
(M, •)→ (N, ◦) satisfies
β(T•(y1, . . . , yk)) = T◦(β(y1), . . . , β(yk))
4 More on magmas and magma homomorphisms can be found, e.g. in [Se65, Ge94].
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for all y1, . . . , yk ∈ M . In particular, the magma morphisms β1(x, ·), β2(x, ·)
(x ∈ S) fulfill this property.
Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s1, . . . , sm}, {t1, . . . , tn} ⊂ M , respectively.
The secret key spaces SKA, SKB of Alice and Bob are subsets of S1, S2, re-
spectively, and they depend on these public elements. It is sufficient that β1, β2
fulfill condition (1) only for all x ∈ SKA, SKB, respectively, and that condition
(3) holds for all a ∈ SKA, b ∈ SKB.
Now, Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key a ∈ SKA, and Bob chooses his secret key
b ∈ SKB.
2. Alice computes the elements β1(a, t1), . . . , β1(a, tn) ∈ N , and sends them to
Bob. Analogously Bob computes the elements β2(b, s1), . . . , β2(b, sm) ∈
N , and sends them to Alice.
3. Alice, knowing pi1(a) = T•1(r1, . . . , rk) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
Bob’s public key
T◦1(β2(b, r1), . . . , β2(b, rk)) = β2(b, T•1(r1, . . . , rk)) = β2(b, pi1(a)).
And Bob, knowing p2(b) = T
′
•2(u1, . . . , uk′) with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, com-
putes from Alice’s public key
T ′◦2(β1(a, u1), . . . , β1(a, uk′)) = β1(a, T
′
•2(u1, . . . , uk′)) = β1(a, pi2(b)).
4. Alice computes K := γ1(a, β2(b, pi1(a))). Bob also computes the shared key
γ2(b, β1(a, pi2(b)))
(3)
= K.
Note that the protocols described in section 2.1 are special instances of this
general AAG like protocol for magmas.
A natural special case of this scheme is given byM = N = S1 = S2. This implies
that the functions βi, γi, for i = 1, 2, induce further binary operations on M . If
additionally •i = ◦i holds for i = 1, 2, then M satisfies some distributive laws.
This will lead to the notion of LD- and multi-LD-systems (see section 4).
Another specification of our general magma-based scheme is discussed in the
next subsection.
3.2 Non-associative KEP based on simultaneous DCP
3.2.1 Specifications
We consider the following specifications of the AAG scheme for magmas:
Let G = M = N be a group, and set S1 = S2 = G
2. The group multiplication
symbol in G will usually be omitted. The operations •i, ◦i (i = 1, 2) on G are
defined by
x •1 y = x •2 y = x ◦1 y = x ◦2 y ≡ x • y := xy
−1x,
and the functions β1, β2 : G
2 ×G→ G are defined by
β1((x1, x2), y) = β2((x1, x2), y) ≡ β((x1, x2), y) := x1yx2.
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β(x, ·) fulfills the homomorphy condition (1), for all x = (x1, x2) ∈ G
2, because
β((x1, x2), y1) • β((x1, x2), y2) = (x1y1x2) • (x1y2x2) =
(x1y1x2)x
−1
2 y
−1
2 x
−1
1 (x1y1x2) = x1(y1y
−1
2 y1)x2 = β((x1, x2), y1 • y2).
Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s1, . . . , sm}, {t1, . . . , tn} ⊂ G, respectively.
The secret key spaces of Alice and Bob are SKA = G×SA and SKB = SB×G,
where SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉• and SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉• denote submagmas of (G, •)
generated by the publicly assigned elements.
The projections pi1, pi2 : G
2 → G and the functions γ1, γ2 : G
2 × G → G are
defined by
pi1(x, y) = y, pi2(x, y) = x and γ1((x1, x2), y) = x1y, γ2((x1, x2), y) = yx2.
These definitions satisfy condition (3), because
γ1(a, β(b, pi1(a))) = γ1(a, β(b, ar)) = γ1(a, blarbr) = al(blarbr)
= (alblar)br = γ2(b, alblar) = γ2(b, β(a, bl)) = γ2(b, β(a, pi2(b)))
for all a = (al, ar), b = (bl, br) ∈ G
2.
We skip repeating all the protocol steps from section 3.1 with these specifica-
tions. The base problem for these non-associative scheme is discussed in the
next subsubsection.
3.2.2 A related non-commutative scheme
Consider the right part of Alice’s key ar = T•(r1, . . . , rk) ∈ SA with ri ∈
{s1, . . . , sm}. If we view ar as a word in the si’s, then we observe that ar is
self-reverse and the exponent signs of ar alternate, beginning and ending with
a positive sign. For example, we have
(r1 • r2) • (r3 • (r4 • r5)) = r1r
−1
2 r1r
−1
3 r4r
−1
5 r4r
−1
3 r1r
−1
2 r1.
While in this scheme alternating exponent signs are essential to gurantee that
condition (1) holds, the self-reverse property seems to be superflous. It comes
from the self-reverse property of the non-associative operation •. Anyway, for
example in order to compute blarbr, Alice actually doesn’t need to know ar as
a tree-word in the submagma 〈s1, . . . , s|m〉•. Rather it suffices to know ar as
an “alternating” word of the form si1s
−1
i2
si3 · · · s
−1
i2l
si2l+1 .
Therefore, we give up this restricted key choice and define modified (bigger)
secret key spaces by SKA = G× SK
(r)
A and SKB = SK
(l)
B ×G with
SK
(r)
A = {r1r
−1
2 r3r
−1
4 · · · r
−1
2l r2l+1 | ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ l, l ∈ N},
SK
(l)
B = {u1u
−1
2 u3u
−1
4 · · ·u
−1
2l′ u2l′+1 | uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn} ∀1 ≤ j ≤ l
′, l′ ∈ N}.
Then, Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key (al, ar) ∈ G × SK
(r)
A . Bob chooses his secret
key (bl, br) ∈ SK
(l)
B ×G.
2. Alice computes the elements alt1ar, . . . , altnar, and sends them to Bob.
Analogously Bob computes the elements bls1br, . . . , blsmbr, and sends
them to Alice.
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3. Alice, knowing ar = r1r
−1
2 r3r
−1
4 · · · r
−1
2l r2l+1 with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, com-
putes from Bob’s public key
(blr1br)(blr2br)
−1(blr3br) · · · (blr2lbr)
−1(blr2l+1br)
= bl(r1r
−1
2 r3 · · · r
−1
2l r2l+1)br = blarbr.
Bob, knowing bl = u1u
−1
2 u3u
−1
4 · · ·u
−1
2l′ u2l′+1 with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, com-
putes from Alice’s public key
(alu1ar)(alu2ar)
−1(alu3ar) · · · (alu2l′ar)
−1(alu2l′+1ar)
= al(u1u
−1
2 u3 · · ·u
−1
2l′ u2l′+1)ar = alblar.
4. Alice computesK := al(blarbr). Bob also computes the shared key (alblar)br =
K.
It is easy to show that this scheme is a further instance of the generalized
AAG scheme for monoids (section 2.1). Therefore one simply has to turn the
sets SK
(r)
A and SK
(l)
B into monoids by introducing some “forgetful” operations
as exercised, e.g., in the proof of 2.1.
In order to break this scheme an attacker obviously has to solve the following
Base Problem:
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 and (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ G
2
with s′i = blsibr ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m and t
′
j = altjar ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n for some
(unknown) al, br ∈ G, bl ∈ SK
(l)
B , ar ∈ SK
(r)
A .
Objective: Find K = alblarbr.
A successful attack on Alice’s secret key requires the solution of the following
n-simDP (n-Simultaneous Decomposition Problem):
Input: Element pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ G
2 with t′j = altjar ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n for
some (unknown) al ∈ G, ar ∈ SK
(r)
A .
Objective: Find elements a′l ∈ G, a
′
r ∈ SK
(r)
A with a
′
ltja
′
r = t
′
j for all j =
1, . . . , n.
A solution (a′l, a
′
r) to this n-simDP satisfies the property a
′
lya
′
r = alyar for all
y ∈ SK
(l)
B .
Analogeously, a successful attack on Bob’s secret key requires the solution of
the following
m-simDP (m-Simultaneous Decomposition Problem):
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 with s′i = blsibr ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m
for some (unknown) bl ∈ SK
(l)
B , br ∈ G.
Objective: Find elements b′l ∈ SK
(l)
B , b
′
r ∈ G with b
′
lsib
′
r = s
′
i for all i =
1, . . . ,m.
A solution (b′l, b
′
r) to this m-simDP satisfies the property b
′
lxb
′
r = blxbr for all
x ∈ SK
(r)
A .
Therefore, a solution to both problems provides the attacker with the shared
secret, because
(a′lb
′
la
′
r)b
′
r = (alb
′
lar)b
′
r = al(b
′
larb
′
r) = al(blarbr) = K.
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Here the first and the last equality hold, because b′l ∈ SK
(l)
B and ar ∈ SK
(r)
A ,
respectively. Alternatively, we can use equality chain
a′l(b
′
la
′
rb
′
r) = a
′
l(bla
′
rbr) = (a
′
lbla
′
r)br = (alblar)br = K,
where here the first and the last equality hold, because a′r ∈ SK
(r)
A and bl ∈
SK
(l)
B , respectively. Further, the first equality chain shows us, that it is sufficient
to find a solution (a′l, a
′
r) ∈ G
2 to the n-SDP and a solution (b′l, b
′
r) ∈ SK
(l)
B ×G
to the m-simDP. Analogously, the second equality chain shows us, that it is
sufficient to find a solution (a′l, a
′
r) ∈ G × SK
(r)
A to the n-SDP and a solution
(b′l, b
′
r) ∈ G
2 to the m-simDP.
Note that the knowledge of one secret key, e.g. Alice’s key (al, ar) ∈ G×SK
(r)
A ,
is not sufficient for an attacker to obtain the shared secret K, because he needs
not only ar expressed in the generators of the group G, but rather an expression
of the form
ar = r1r
−1
2 r3r
−1
4 · · · r
−1
2l r2l+1 with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}.
Remark. An attacker might approach an n-simDP instance {(ti, t
′
i)}i≤n by
considering the
(
n
2
)
-ssCSP instance {(t′i(t
′
j)
−1, tit
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} or the(
n
2
)
-ssCSP instance {(t−1i tj , (t
′
i)
−1t′j) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} in order to solve for al or
ar, respectively. For example, in the latter case, we have
a−1r t
−1
i tjar = (a
−1
r t
−1
i a
−1
l )(altjar) = (t
′
i)
−1t′j .
Therefore, either the simultaneous (subgroup)-CSP has to be hard in G, or,
if the simCSP is (at least heuristically) approachable in G, it is recommended
that the sets {t−1i tj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} and {tit
−1
j | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} have large
centralizers. This may be ensured by if the set {t1, . . . , tn} itself has a large
centralizer, an thus also SB.s Similarly SA should have a large centralizer.
3.3 Non-associative KEP based on simultaneous symmet-
ric DP
Here we consider the following specifications of the AAG scheme for magmas:
Let k, l ∈ N be G = M = N = S1 = S2 be a group. The group multiplication
symbol in G will usually be omitted. The operations •i, ◦i (i = 1, 2) on G are
defined as in the previous subsection by
x •1 y = x •2 y = x ◦1 y = x ◦2 y ≡ x • y := xy
−1x,
and the functions β1, β2 : G×G→ G are defined by
β1(x, y) = x
kyx, β2(x, y) = xyx
l.
βi(x, ·) (i = 1, 2) fulfills the homomorphy condition (1) for all x ∈ G, because
βi(x, y1) • βi(x, y2) = (x
ky1x
l) • (xky2x
l) =
(xky1x
l)x−ly−12 x
−k(xky1x
l) = xk(y1y
−1
2 y1)x
l = βi(x, y1 • y2),
where either k = 1 or l = 1.
Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s1, . . . , sm}, {t1, . . . , tn} ⊂ G, respectively.
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The secret key spaces of Alice and Bob are the submagmas SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉•
and SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉• of (G, •) generated by the publicly assigned elements.
The projections pi1, pi2 are the identity idG, and the functions γ1, γ2 : G×G→ G
are defined by
γ1(x, y) = x
ky, γ2(x, y) = yx
l.
These definitions satisfy condition (3), which gives the shared key
γ1(a, β(b, pi1(a))) = γ1(a, bab
l) = akbabl = γ2(b, a
kba) = γ2(b, β(a, pi2(b))).
Consider the simultaneous version of symmetrical decomposition problem
(see [CDW07]).
n-sim (k, l)-SDP (n-simultaneous (k, l)-Symmetrical Decomposition Problem):
Input: Integers (k, l) ∈ Z2 and element pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ G
2 with
t′j = a
ktja
l ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n for some (unknown) a ∈ G.
Objective: Find elements a′ ∈ G with a′ktja
′l = t′j for all j = 1, . . . , n.
We conclude that an attack on Alice’s or Bob’s private key has to master an
n-sim (k, 1)-SDP or an m-sim (1, l)-SDP, respectively.
Remark. One may also consider a variant of that KEP where the integers
k, l are parts of Alice’s and Bob’s secrret key. In particular, set S1 = S2 = Z×G,
pi1 = pi2 : (p, x) 7→ x, β1((k, a), y) = a
kya, β2((l, b), y) = byb
l, γ1((k, a), v) =
akv, and γ2((l, b), v) = vb
l. Then an attack, e.g. on Alice’s secret key, has
provide k ∈ Z and a ∈ G such that aktja = t
′
j for all j.
4 Non-associative schemes for LD-systems
4.1 LD- and multi-LD-systems
4.1.1 Definition
Definition 4.1. An LD-system (S, ∗) is a set S equipped with a binary opera-
tion ∗ on S which satisfies the left-selfdistributivity law
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ (x ∗ z) ∀x, y, z ∈ S.
Definition 4.2. (Section X.3. in [De00]) Let I be an index set. A multi-LD-
system (S, (∗i)i∈I) is a set S equipped with a family of binary operations (∗i)i∈I
on S such that
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = (x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) ∀x, y, z ∈ S
is satisfied for every i, j in I. Especially, it holds for i = j, i.e., (S, ∗i) is an
LD-system. If |I| = 2 then we call S a bi-LD-system.
A classical example for an LD-system is given by a group G equipped with
the conjugacy operation x ∗ y = x−1yx. We also mention the Laver tables
(Chapter X in [De00]) as standard examples for finite monogenic LD-systems.
Many examples for LD-, bi-LD- and multi-LD-systems are given in Dehornoy’s
monography [De00].
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4.1.2 f-conjugacy
One may consider several generalizations of the conjugacy operation as candi-
dates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an Ansatz like x ∗ y =
f(x−1)g(y)h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 4.3. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary
operation x ∗ y = f(x−1) · g(y) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
fh = f, gh = hg = hf, fg = gf = f2, h2 = h. (1)
Proof. A straightforward computation yields
α ∗ (β ∗ γ) = f(α−1)gf(β−1)g2(γ)gh(β)h(α), and
(α ∗ β) ∗ (α ∗ γ) = fh(α−1)fg(β−1)f2(α)gf(α−1)g2(γ)gh(α)hf(α−1)hg(β)h2(α).
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
The simplest solution of the system of equations (1) is f = g and h = id.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.4. (LD- or f-conjugacy) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G).
An ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G×G is called f -LD-conjugated or LD-conjugated, or
simply f -conjugated, denoted by u −→∗f v, if ∃c ∈ G such that v = c ∗f u =
f(c−1u)c.
Remark. For any non-trivial endomorphism f , the relation −→∗f defines
not an equivalence relation on G. Even the relation −→∗ defined by u −→∗ v iff
∃f ∈ Aut(G) s.t. u −→∗f v is not an equivalence relation. Indeed, transitivity
requires the automorphisms (relation must be symmetric!) to be an idempotent
endomorphism (f2 = f) which implies f = id.
Compare the notion of f -LD-conjugacy with the well known notion f -twisted
conjugacy defined by u ∼f v (for f ∈ Aut(G)) iff ∃c ∈ G s.t. v = f(c
−1)uc =:
c ∗twf u, which yields indeed an equivalence relation. On the other hand, the
operation ∗tw = ∗twf is not LD - rather it satisfies the following "near" LD-law:
α ∗tw (β ∗tw γ) = (α ∗tw β) ∗tw (αf ∗tw γ)
where αf is short for f(α).
Anyway, it follows directly from the definitions that u −→∗ v if and only if
f(u) ∼f v, i.e., any f -LD conjugacy problem reduces to a twisted conjugacy
problem and vice versa. Here we have to extend the notion of twisted conjugacy
from f ∈ Aut(G) to all f ∈ End(G).
4.1.3 Shifted conjugacy
Patrick Dehornoy introduced the following generalization of f -conjugacy, and he
points out, that once the definition of shifted conjugacy is used, braids inevitably
appear [De00, De06].
Proposition 4.5. (Exercise I.3.20. in [De00]) Consider a group G, a homo-
morphism f : G→ G, and a fixed element a ∈ G. Then the binary operation
x ∗ y = x ∗f,a y = f(x)
−1 · a · f(y) · x
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yields an LD-structure on G if and only if [a, f2(x)] = 1 for all x ∈ G, and a
satisfies the relation af(a)a = f(a)af(a). Hence the subgroup H = 〈{fn(a) |
n ∈ N}〉 of G is a homomorphic image of the braid group
B∞ = 〈{σi}i≥1 | σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2, σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1〉
with infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is a quotient of B∞.
There exists a straightforward generalization of Proposition 4.5 for multi-
LD-systems:
Proposition 4.6. Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of
endomorphisms (fi)i∈I of G, and a set of fixed elements {ai ∈ G | i ∈ I}. Then
(G, (∗i)i∈I) with
x ∗i y = fi(x
−1) · ai · fi(y) · x
is a multi-LD-system if and only if fi = fj =: f for all i 6= j, [ai, f
2(x)] = 1 for
all x ∈ G, i ∈ I, and aif(ai)aj = f(aj)aif(ai) for all i, j ∈ I.
Proof. A straightforward computation gives
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = fi(x
−1)ai[fi(fj(y
−1))fi(aj)fi(fj(z))fi(y)]x,
(x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) = [fj(x
−1)fj(fi(y
−1))fj(a
−1
i )fj(fi(x))]aj [fj(fi(x
−1)) ·
fj(ai)fj(fi(z))fj(x)][fi(x
−1)aifi(y)x].
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
Note that this proof also contains proofs of Proposition 4.5 (setting |I| = 1)
and of the following Corollary 4.7 (setting G = B∞, I = {1, 2}, s = ∂, ∗1 = ∗,
∗2 = ∗¯, a1 = σ1 and a2 = σ
−1
1 ).
Consider the injective shift endomorphism ∂ : B∞ −→ B∞ defined by σi 7→
σi+1 forall i ≥ 1.
Corollary 4.7. (Shifted conjugacy, Example X.3.5. in [De00]) B∞ equipped
with the shifted conjugacy operations ∗, ∗¯ defined by
x ∗ y = ∂x−1 · σ1 · ∂y · x, x ∗¯ y = ∂x
−1 · σ−11 · ∂y · x
is a bi-LD-system. In particular, (B∞, ∗) is an LD-system.
4.1.4 Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups
In the following we consider generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations
∗ in B∞. Therefore we set f = ∂
p for some p ∈ N, and we choose ai ∈ B2p for
all i ∈ I such that
ai∂
p(ai)aj = ∂
p(aj)ai∂
p(ai) ∀i, j ∈ I. (2)
Since ai ∈ B2p, we have [ai, ∂
2p(x)] = 1 for all x ∈ B∞. Thus the conditions of
Proposition 4.6 are fulfilled, and x ∗i y = x∂
p(y)ai∂
p(x−1) defines an multi-LD-
structure on B∞. For |I| = 1, p = 1 and a = σ1, which implies H = B∞, we
get Dehornoy’s original definition of shifted conjugacy ∗.
It remains to give some natural solutions {ai ∈ B2p | i ∈ I} of the equation set
(1). Note that in case |I| = 1 (notation: a1 = a), of course, every endomorphism
f of B∞ with f(σ1) ∈ B2p provides such solution a = f(σ1).
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Definition 4.8 (Definition I.4.6. in [De00]) Let, for n ≥ 2, be δn = σn−1 · · ·σ2σ1.
For p, q ≥ 1, we set
τp,q = δp+1∂(δp+1) · · · ∂
q−1(δp+1).
Since a = τ±1p,p ∈ B2p fulfills a∂
p(a)a = ∂p(a)a∂p(a), it provides a lot of
(multi)-LD-structures on B∞.
Proposition 4.9 (a) The binary operation x ∗a y = ∂
p(x−1)a∂p(y)x with a =
a′τp,pa
′′ for some a′, a′′ ∈ Bp yields an LD-structure on B∞ if and only if
[a′, a′′] = 1.
(b) Let I be an index set. The binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x with
ai = a
′
iτp,pa
′′
i for some a
′
i, a
′′
i ∈ Bp (i ∈ I) yields a multi-LD-structure on B∞
if and only if [a′i, a
′
j ] = [a
′
i, a
′′
j ] = 1 for all i, j ∈ I. (Note that a
′′
i and a
′′
j needn’t
commute for i 6= j.)
(c) The binary operations x∗iy = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x (i = 1, 2) with a1 = a
′
1τp,pa
′′
1 ,
a2 = a
′
2τ
−1
p,pa
′′
2 for some a
′
1, a
′′
1 , a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp yields a bi-LD-structure on B∞ if
and only if [a′1, a
′′
1 ] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2 ] = [a
′
1, a
′′
2 ] = [a
′
2, a
′′
1 ] = [a
′
1, a
′
2] = 1. (Note that a
′′
1
and a′′2 needn’t commute.)
Another solutionWe see that there exist infinitely many (multi)-LD-structures
on B∞. Further examples are provided by Proposition 4.10, which, of course,
admits a lot of variations and generalizations.
Proposition 4.10 Let be p, p1, p2 ∈ N with p1 + p2 = p. The binary operation
x ∗a y = ∂
p(x−1)a∂p(y)x with
a = a′1∂
p1(a′2)∂
p1(τp2,p)τ
−1
p,p1
a′′1∂
p1(a′′2 )
for some a′1, a
′′
1 ∈ Bp1 , a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp2 yields an LD-structure on B∞ if and only
if [a′1, a
′′
1 ] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2 ] = 1.
The proofs of Proposition 4.9 and 4.10 are straightforward computations.
The reader is recommended to draw some pictures.
4.1.5 Yet another group-based LD-system
Though we are sure that it must have been well known to experts, we haven’t
been able to find the following natural LD-operation for groups in the literature.
For a group G, (G, ◦) is an LD-system with x ◦ y = xy−1x.
Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation ∗, for this "symmetric decom-
position" or conjugacy operation ◦, the corresponding relation −→◦ defined by
x −→◦ y iff ∃c ∈ G such that y = c ◦ x) is not an equivalence relation. In
particular, −→◦ is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive.
One may consider several generalizations of this symmetric conjugacy operation
◦, as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an Ansatz like
x ◦ y = f(x)g(y−1)h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 4.11. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary
operation x ◦ y = f(x) · g(y−1) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
f2 = f, fh = gh = fg, hg = gf = hf, h2 = h. (3)
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Proof. A straightforward computation yields
α ◦ (β ◦ γ) = f(α)gh(β−1)g2(γ)gf(β−1)h(α), and
(α ◦ β) ◦ (α ◦ γ) = f2(α)fg(β−1)fh(α)gh(α−1)g2(γ)gf(α−1)hf(α)hg(β−1)h2(α).
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
Except for f2 = f = g = h = h2, the simplest solutions of the system of
equations (3) are f2 = f = g and h = id, or f = id and g = h = h2.
Corollary 4.12. (LD- or f-symmetric conjugacy) Let G be a group, and
f ∈ End(G) an endomorphism that is also a projector (f2 = f). Then (G, ◦f )
and (G, ◦revf ), defined by x ◦f y = f(xy
−1)x and x ◦revf y = xf(y
−1x), are LD-
systems.
Proposition 4.13. Let G be a group, and f, g ∈ End(G).
(i) Then the binary operations ◦f and ∗f (and ∗
rev
f ), defined by x ◦f y = f(x) ·
g(y−1) · h(x) and x ∗f y = f(x
−1 · y) · h(x) (x ∗revf y = x · f(y · x
−1)), are
distributive over ◦. In particular ∗ (∗rev) is distributive over ◦. In short, the
following equations hold.
x ∗f (y ◦ z) = (x ∗f y) ◦ (x ∗f z), x ◦f (y ◦ z) = (x ◦f y) ◦ (◦fz)∀x, y, z ∈ G.
(ii) The operations ◦f and ∗f (∗
rev
f ) are distributive over ◦g if and only if f =
gf = fg.
4.2 Non-associative AAG f-commutator KEP
Now we consider the most natural special case of our general AAG scheme for
magmas (see section 3.1). Let be M = N = S. This implies that the functions
βi, γi, for i = 1, 2, induce further binary operations on M . In particular, we
introduce the notation x ∗i y = βi(x, y). Now, the homomorphy condition (1)
(in section 3.1) reads as
x ∗1 (y •2 y
′) = (x ∗1 y) ◦2 (x ∗1 y
′) and
x ∗2 (y •1 y
′) = (x ∗2 y) ◦1 (x ∗2 y
′).
If •i = ◦i holds for i = 1, 2, then M fulfills two distributive laws. And if
additionally ◦2 = ◦1 = ∗1 = ∗2 =: ∗, then (M, ∗) is an LD-system.
We observe that LD-systems occur in a very natural special case of the general
AAG scheme for magmas. Nevertheless, this does not imply that we get by that
construction KEP’s for all LD-systems. Indeed, in order to obtain a shared key,
we have to specify the projections pi1 and binary operations γi which themselves
depend on the specification of the LD-operation ∗. In the following we set
pii = idM for i = 1, 2.
Now, we establish a (non-associative) AAG-KEP for groups with f -conjugacy
as LD-operation. Let M = G be a group, f ∈ End(G), then (G,+) with ∗ = ∗f
(see Def. 4.4) is an LD-system according to Proposition 4.3.
Definition 4.14. (f-commutator) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G). The
f -commutator of an ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G×G is defined by
[u, v]f := u
−1f(v−1)f(u)v.
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The AAG f -commutator KEP is given by the following further specifications
of the general AAG scheme for magmas (section 3.1).
γ1(u, v) = u
−1v, γ2(u, v) = v
−1u.
Now, Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key a in the public submagma S1 = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗
of (G, ∗), and Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ S2 = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗.
2. Alice computes the elements a ∗ t1, . . . , a ∗ tn ∈ G, and sends them to Bob.
Analogously Bob computes the elements b ∗ s1, . . . , b ∗ sm ∈ G, and sends
them to Alice.
3. Alice, knowing a = T∗(r1, . . . , rk) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
Bob’s public key
T∗(b ∗ r1, . . . , b ∗ rk) = b ∗ T∗(r1, . . . , rk)) = b ∗ a = f(b
−1a)b.
And Bob, knowing b = T ′∗(u1, . . . , uk′) with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, computes
from Alice’s public key
T ′∗(a ∗ u1, . . . , a ∗ uk′) = a ∗ T
′
∗(u1, . . . , uk′) = a ∗ b = f(a
−1b)a.
4. Alice computes K := γ1(a, b ∗ a) = a
−1(b ∗ a) = a−1f(b−1a)b = [a, b]f . Bob
gets the shared key by γ2(b, a ∗ b) = (a ∗ b)
−1b = (f(a−1b)a)−1b
(3)
= K.
In order to break this scheme an attacker obviously has to solve the following
base problem.
f-AAGP (f -Commutator AAG-Problem): Let (G, ∗) be a group with α ∗ β =
f(α−1β)α for some f ∈ End(G). Furthermore, let A = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉∗ and
B = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉∗ be two f.g. submagmas of (G, ∗).
Input: {(ai, y ∗ ai) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {(bj , x ∗ bj) ∈ G
2|j = 1, . . . ,m} with
x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
Objective: Find the f -commutator [x, y]f := x
−1f(y−1x)y.
But a successful attack on Bob’s secret key requires at least the solution of
the following
m-sim f-CSP (m-Simultaneous f -Conjugacy Search Problem):
Input: Pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 with s′i = b∗si = f(b
−1si)b ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m
for some (unknown) b ∈ G.
Objective: Find an element b′ ∈ G with f(b′−1si)b
′ = f(b−1si)b
′ for all i =
1, . . . ,m.
Even if one solves that problem, one might have not found Bob’s original
secret b. This raises the question of how rigid solutions to the simultaneous
f -CSP are. A vague indication for some kind of rigidity is the fact that f(b′b−1)
and b′b−1 are conjugated with every f(si) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) being a valid conjugator.
Anyway, even if an attacker finds Bob’s original key b, then she still faces the
following problem.
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∗f -MSP (∗f -submagma Membership Search Problem):
Input: b, t1, . . . , tn ∈ G.
Objective: Find an expression of b as a tree-word in the submagma 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗f
(notation b = T∗f (u1, . . . , uk) for ui ∈ {tj}j≤n), if it exists.
Another approach is to attack (additionally to Bob’s secret key) also Al-
ice’s key, i.e., to solve for the n-simultaneous f -CSP-instance {(tj , t
′
j)}j≤n with
t′j = f(a
−1tj)a. An oracle to that problem provides an element a
′ ∈ G such
that t′j = f(a
′−1tj)a
′ for all j. Then the attacker hopes that computation of the
f -commutator [a′, b′]f =: K
′ might give her the shared key K = [a, b]f .
Though the f -CSP seems to be particulary interesting for non-invertible endo-
morphism f ∈ End(G), here we compare K ′ with K for the simplest case where
f ∈ Inn(G), i.e., there exists an element p ∈ G s.t. f(x) = p−1xp. Then it is
easy to show that b′b−1 =: c1 lies in
⋂
iCG(sip), and a
′a−1 = c2 ∈
⋂
j CG(tjp).
A straightforward computation gives
K ′ = a′−1p−1b′−1a′pb′ = a−1c−12 p
−1b−1c−11 c2apc1b.
We conclude that K ′ = K if [c1, c2] = [c1, ap] = [c2, bp] = 1. But, in general, we
have CG(ap) 6=
⋂
i CG(sip) and CG(bp) 6=
⋂
j CG(tjp). Therefore, even in the
case of f ∈ Inn(G), we can’t hope to reduce the f -AAGP to a simultaneous
subgroup CSP, as we have done it for the classical AAGP in Proposition 2.3.
Nevertheless, as in the remark at the end of section 3.2.2, one may approach
an n-sim f -CSP instance {(ti, t
′
i)}i≤n by considering the
(
n
2
)
-simCSP instance
{(t−1i tj , (t
′
i)
−1t′j) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} in order to solve for a. Indeed, here we have
a−1t−1i tja = (a
−1f(t−1i a))(f(a
−1tj)ar) = (t
′
i)
−1t′j .
Therefore, either the simultaneous CSP has to be hard in G, or, if the simCSP
is (at least heuristically) approachable in G, it is recommended that the sets
{t−1i tj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} and {tit
−1
j | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} have large centralizers. This
may be ensured by if the set {t1, . . . , tn} itself has a large centralizer. Similarly
{s1, . . . , sm} should have a large centralizer.
4.2.1 An example in pure braid groups
Here we a concrete suggestion for the group G and the endomorphism f ∈
End(G). Let G be the n-strand pure braid group Pn. For some small integer
d ≥ 1, consider the epimorphism ηd : Pn −→ Pn−d given by ’pulling out’ (or
erasing) the last d strands, i.e. the strands n − d + 1, . . . , n. Recall the shift
map ∂, and note that ∂d(Pn−d) ≤ Pn. Now, we define the endomorphism
f : Pn −→ Pn by the composition f = ∂
d ◦ η.
4.3 Non-associative AAG shifted commutator KEP in braid
groups
Here we establish a (non-associative) AAG-KEP for braid groups with shifted
conjugacy as LD-operation. Recall from Corollary 4.7 that the braid group
(B∞, ∗, ∗¯) forms a bi-LD-system. Also recall the definition of shift endomor-
phism ∂.
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Definition 4.15. (shifted commutator) The shifted commutator of an or-
dered pair (u, v) ∈ B2∞ is defined by
[u, v]sh := u
−1∂(v−1)σ1∂(u)v.
The AAG shifted commutator KEP for the bi-LD-system (B∞, ∗, ∗¯) is given
by the following further specifications of the general AAG scheme for magmas
(section 3.1).
Set M = N = S = B∞, pii = idM , βi(x, y) =: x ∗i y, •i = ◦i = ∗i for i = 1, 2,
and
x ∗1 y = x ∗¯ y = ∂(x
−1)σ−11 ∂(y)x, x ∗2 y = x ∗ y = ∂(x
−1)σ1∂(y)x, and
γ1(u, v) = u
−1v, γ2(u, v) = v
−1u.
Now, Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key a in the public submagma S1 = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗¯
of (B∞, ∗, ∗¯), and Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ S2 = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗.
2. Alice computes the elements a∗¯t1, . . . , a∗¯tn ∈ G, and sends them to Bob.
Analogously Bob computes the elements b ∗ s1, . . . , b ∗ sm ∈ G, and sends
them to Alice.
3. Alice, knowing a = T∗¯(r1, . . . , rk) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
Bob’s public key
T∗¯(b ∗ r1, . . . , b ∗ rk) = b ∗ T∗¯(r1, . . . , rk) = b ∗ a = ∂(b
−1)σ1∂(a)b.
And Bob, knowing b = T ′∗(u1, . . . , uk′) with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, computes
from Alice’s public key
T ′∗(a∗¯u1, . . . , a∗¯uk′) = a∗¯T
′
∗(u1, . . . , uk′) = a∗¯b = ∂(a
−1)σ−11 ∂(b)a.
4. Alice computes K := γ1(a, b ∗ a) = a
−1(b ∗ a) = a−1∂(b−1)σ1∂(a)b = [a, b]sh.
Bob gets the shared key by γ2(b, a∗¯b) = (a∗¯b)
−1b = (∂(a−1)σ−11 ∂(b)a)
−1b
(3)
=
K.
In order to break this scheme an attacker obviously has to solve the following
base problem.
sh-AAGP (shifted Commutator AAG-Problem): Consider the bi-LD-system (B∞, ∗, ∗¯).
Let A = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉∗¯ and B = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 be two f.g. submagmas of
(B∞, ∗, ∗¯).
Input: {(ai, y ∗ ai) ∈ G
2|i = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {(bj , x∗¯bj) ∈ G
2|j = 1, . . . ,m} with
x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
Objective: Find the shifted commutator [x, y]sh := x
−1∂(y−1)σ1∂(x)y.
But a successful attack on Bob’s secret key requires at least the solution of
the following
m-sim sh-CSP (m-simultaneous shifted Conjugacy Search Problem):
Input: Pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 with s′i = b ∗ si = ∂(b
−1)σ1∂(si)b
∀1 ≤ i ≤ m for some (unknown) b ∈ G.
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Objective: Find an element b′ ∈ G with ∂(b′−1)σ1∂(si)b
′ = ∂(b−1)σ1∂(si)b
′
for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
As in the case of f -conjugacy, one may argue that finding b is not sufficient,
since the attacker still faces a submagma MSP for (B∞, ∗, ∗¯). Furthermore, as
for ∗f , one may show that solving two simultaneous sh-CSP’s (for Alice’s and
Bob’s private keys) does in general not reduce the sh-AAGP to a simultaneous
subgroup CSP, as for the classical AAGP.
Remark. Note that we actually do not need a bi-LD-system, like (B∞, ∗, ∗¯),
in order to build a AAG shifted commutator KEP. Indeed, two LD-operations,
namely x ∗ y = ∂(x−1)σ1∂(y)x and its reverse x ∗
rev y = x∂(y)σ1∂(x
−1), suffice.
Here (B∞, ∗, ∗
rev) is not a bi-LD-system.
Alice and Bob choose a ∈ 〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗ and b ∈ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗rev , and send
{a−1 ∗rev tj}j≤n and {b
−1 ∗ si}i≤m, respectively. Then they may compute
KA = a
−1(b−1 ∗ a) = a−1∂(b)σ1∂(a)b
−1 = [a, b−1]sh = (a
−1 ∗rev b)b−1 = KB.
Analogeously, one may build an AAG f -commutator KEP using ∗f and its
reverse operation.
Non-simultaneity. Analogeous to the remarks in sections 3.2.2 and 4.2,
an attacker might approach an m-sim shCP instance {(si, s
′
i = b ∗ si)}i≤m by
considering the
(
m
2
)
-simCSP instance {(∂(s−1i sj), (s
′
i)
−1s′j) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m} in
order to solve for b. Indeed, here we have
b−1∂(s−1i sj)b = (b
−1∂(s−1i )σ
−1
1 ∂(b))(∂(b
−1)σ1∂(sj)b) = (s
′
i)
−1s′j .
Therefore, either it is recommended that the set {s−1i sj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m} (and
analogeously {t−1i tj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}) has large centralizer. This may be ensured
by if the sets {s1, . . . , sm} and {t1, . . . , tn} itself have a large centralizer.
Another strategy is to abandon simultaneity, i.e, to consider the critical case
m = n = 1. Note that only for shifted conjugacy (and its generalizations) we
have opportunity to abandon simultaneity because only here the submagmas
〈s〉∗, 〈s〉∗¯ generated by one element are nontrivial. This is not the case for
f -conjugacy or the LD-operation ◦ from section 4.1.5.
Generalized shifted conjugacy. It is straightforward to construct non-
associative KEP’s using generalized shifted conjugacy operations. We leave this
to the reader.
5 Generalizations, further work and open prob-
lems
5.1 AAG-schemes over non-associative and non-commutative
algebras
It is possible to generalize the AAG-KEP for magmas from section 3.1 in several
ways. One generalization is very simple - just replace the magmas (M, •1, •2)
and (N, ◦1, ◦2) by (M, {•1,i}i∈I1 , {•2,i}i∈I2) and (N, {◦1,i}i∈I1 , {◦2,i}i∈I2) for
some index sets I1, I2, i.e. we introduce further binary operations. In particu-
lar, in the special case given by M = N = S1 = S2 and pi1 = pi2 = idM , Alice
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chooses her secret key a as an element from the submagma 〈s1, . . . , sm〉{•1,i}i∈I1 .
To describe an element of such a submagma it is not sufficient to know the pla-
nar rooted binary tree T (providing the bracket structure) and the leaf elements
r1, . . . , rk ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, but we also need to assign binary operations (from
the set {•1,i}i∈I1) to the internal nodes of the tree T .
For example,
In the following we write T{•1,i}i∈I1 , and we assume that T is then a planar
rooted binary tree accompanied with such an assignment of its internal nodes.
Here we have to modify condition (1) from section 3.1 in the obvious way:
(1’) β1(x, ·) : (M, •2,i) → (N, ◦2,i) is for all x ∈ S1, i ∈ I2 a magma homo-
morphism, i.e.
∀x ∈ S1, y, y
′ ∈M, i ∈ I2 : β1(x, y •2,i y
′) = β1(x, y) ◦2,i β1(x, y
′).
Also β2(x, ·) : (M, •1,i) → (N, ◦1,i) is for all x ∈ S2, i ∈ I1 a magma morphism,
i.e.
∀x ∈ S2, y, y
′ ∈M, i ∈ I1 : β2(x, y •1,i y
′) = β2(x, y) ◦1,i β2(x, y
′).
If β1, β2 are defined by a binary operation from a bi- or multi-LD-system,
then condtion (1’) is satisfied by construction. Now one may build KEP’s with
this obvious modification. One example is the AAG shifted commutator KEP
for the bi-LD-system (B∞, ∗, ∗¯). Indeed, there Alice and Bob may have choosen
their secret keys from 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗,∗¯ of (B∞, ∗, ∗¯) and 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗,∗¯, respec-
tively.
Recall that bi- and multi-LD-systems fulfill more homomorphic properties (i.e.
distributive laws) than is necessary to build a KEP. As an example, consider
the group ring ZG. Recall that (G, ∗f ) is an LD-system for any f ∈ End(G).
By construction, (ZG, ∗f ,+) is a non-commutative and non-associative alge-
bra. It is straightforward to build a non-associative KEP over ZG analogous to
the non-associative AAG f -commutator KEP. The only modification is that
we choose the secret keys a ∈ 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗f ,+ and b ∈ 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗f ,+ for
s1, · · · , sm, t1, · · · , tn ∈ ZG.
Analogoulsly, it is straightforward to build a non-associative KEP over the non-
associative bialgebra (ZB∞, ∗, ∗¯,+).
Furthermore, one could consider non-commutative (but associative) special cases
of these KEP’s over non-associative algebras, if one restricts the secret keys
a, b (or more precisely the projectio n pi1(a), pi2(b)) to 〈s1, · · · , sm〉+ and b ∈
〈t1, · · · , tn〉+, respectively.
5.2 Open problems and further work
• The AAG-KEP for magmas (see section 3.1) describes a general framework
for building non-associative key establishment protocols. Our main exam-
ples are provided by LD-operations (f -conjugacy in groups and shifted
conjugacy in braid groups). Recall also the systems based on (simulta-
neous) symmetric DP employing the non-associative operation given by
x • y = xy−1x.
Find other interesting instances of the general AAG-KEP for magmas (see
section 3.1).
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• Find other platform groups for the non-associative AAG f -commutator
KEP (see section 4.2).
In particular, solve the (simultaneous) f -conjugacy problem in pure braid
groups for the endomorphism f described in section 4.2.1.
• How rigid are the solutions to the f -conjugacy problem in pure braid
groups and the shifted conjugacy problem in braid groups? Note that,
contrary to the f -conjugacy problem in pure braid groups, there exists a
solution to the shifted conjugacy problem in braid groups [KLT09].
• Investigate heuristic attacks, especially length-based attacks [HT02, GK+05],
on the submagmaMSP for non-associative LD-operations ∗ in braid groups.
Of particular interest is here the non-simultaneous case m = 1 which
emerges only for non-associative operations. I.e. consider the submagma
MSP for the submagma 〈s1〉∗ generated by only one element.
• Recall the important special case of the AAG-KEP for magmas where
S = M = N is an LD-system. Depending on the LD-operation ∗, we
constructed for some instances non-associative KEP’s by specifying the
functions γi (i = 1, 2). It would be nice to have non-associative KEP’s for
all LD-systems.
Such non-associative KEP’s for all LD-systems, bi-LD- and multi-LD-
systems (in general: sets with distributive operations) have been con-
structed - see our forthcoming paper [KaT12]. There we have to go even a
step beyond the general AAG-KEP for magmas, and we introduce a small
asymmetry in the non-associative AAG protocol. Indeed, we consider the
systems and instances given in [KaT12] as more practical and interesting
than the one given in this paper. Since the KEP’s given in [KaT12] work
for all multi-LD-systems, they deploy two further advantages.
(1) We can consider encryption functions using iterated ∗-multiplication
from the left. In order to obtain the secret key an attacker has to solve
then an iterated f - or shifted conjugacy problem.
(2) For a given (partial) multi-LD-system (M, {∗i}i∈I) it turns out that
even the used operations ∗i can be hidden, i.e., they are part of the secret
key.
• Develop other primitives like signature and authentication schemes in non-
associative cryptography.
Here we concentrated on KEP’s which are usually the hardest to construct.
Note that, using hash functions, it is easy to build public key encryption
schemes from KEP’s.
• For infinite groups, like braid groups, there are limitations on the depths
of the trees describing a submagma element . Consider for example f -
conjugacy in an infinte group G where f ∈ End(G) satisfies |f(x)| ≤ |x|
for all x ∈ G. Denote by | · | = | · |X the word length over some given
generating set X of G. We conclude that
|x ∗f y| ≤ |f(x
−1)|+ |f(y)|+ |x| ≤ 2|x|+ |y| ≤ 3max{|x|, |y|}.
Now, consider the following two extreme cases of trees with k leaves defin-
ing the bracket structure of a magma element in 〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗ (∗ = ∗f ).
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The left comb (rj ∈ {si}i≤m for all j = 1, . . . k)
LC(r1, . . . , rk) := r1 ∗ (r2 ∗ (r3 ∗ · · · rk−2 ∗ (rk−1 ∗ rk) · · ·)),
and the right comb
RC(r1, . . . , rk) := ((· · · (r1 ∗ r2) ∗ r3 ∗ · · · ∗ rk−2) ∗ rk−1) ∗ rk.
If |si| ≤ l0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, then one may show by induction that
|LC(r1, . . . , rk)| ≤ (2k − 1)l0, |RC(r1, . . . , rk)| ≤ (2
k − 1)l0.
I.e. we can only prove an exponential (in k) upper bound on the word
length of a magma element of tree depth k−1. But for left combs we have
a linear upper bound. In practice, one may consider as keys either only
elements of small tree depth, or we choose such elements whose bracket
structure defining trees have a small "distance" from a left comb.
Define a proper notion of "distance" of planar rooted binary trees, and in-
vestigate how the word length growth for trees with "small distance" from
the left comb LC. Determine a method how such trees can be generated
efficiently.
• Recently B. Tsaban developed a deterministic polynomial time attack on
the AAG commutator KEP in linear groups [Ts12] which also applies to
several other non-commutative schemes. In short, Tsaban’s linear central-
izer attack exploits the fact that in classical AAG-KEP the shared key is
the commutator K = a−1b−1ab. So, if we find solutions (up to centralizer
elements) inside the centralizer of the centralizer of, say SA, then these
centralizer elements cancel and we recover K, even if these solutions were
only in the linear matrix group in which we embed our linear group. But
for KEP’s with shared key K = alblarbr, or K being an f -commutator
in groups or a shifted commutator in braid groups, these centralizer ele-
ments would not cancel. Therefore, we conclude that, in its present state
the linear centralizer attack does not apply to most of the non-associative
schemes presented in this paper.
Can the linear centralizer attack be improved to make it work against
these KEP’s?
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